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ABSTRACT
Life imprisonment has been part of South Africa’s penal regime for decades.
This article analyses how this form of punishment has changed in meaning in
since 1906. The author looks at life imprisonment during the death penalty
period; life imprisonment in the aftermath of the abolition of the death pen
alty; life imprisonment under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, when it could
only be imposed by the High Courts; and life imprisonment during the Crim
inal Law Amendment Act, when the regional courts were also empowered to
impose this sentence. The author discusses the laws and circumstances which
prevailed in the above four periods. With life imprisonment now being the
severest sentence that can be imposed in South Africa, the author highlights
the challenges associated with it and calls upon the government, courts and
civil society to think seriously about how this form of punishment should be
administered so as to avoid confusing inmates and exposing the government
to litigation.
1. Introduction
Life imprisonment (life sentence)1 is probably the most confusing sen-
tence in South Africa, as it does not mean what it actually says. If many
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people, including lawyers and, let it be whispered, some judicial officers,
were asked for the meaning of life imprisonment, they would say that it
means that a person sentenced to life imprisonment will spend the rest
of his or her natural life in prison. This, however, has never been the
meaning of life imprisonment in South Africa.2 While life imprisonment
has never meant life imprisonment in the literal sense in South Africa, its
meaning has changed substantially in the past decades. This article
investigates the meaning and use of life imprisonment in South Africa in
four major legal historical eras: life imprisonment at the time when the
death penalty was still lawful in South Africa (including life imprison-
ment as early as 1906); life imprisonment in the immediate aftermath of
the abolition of the death penalty (1994-1998); life imprisonment follow-
ing the introduction of the minimum sentences legislation (1998-2007);
and life imprisonment after December 2007, when the sentencing juris-
diction of the regional courts was extended to include life imprisonment.
In assessing the meaning and use of life imprisonment during these four
historical periods, the article looks at the law in place at the time and at
how courts interpreted it to justify the imposition of life imprisonment. It
also looks at the relevant statistics to assess the extent to which life
imprisonment was imposed. The article illustrates that, despite the term’s
evident simplicity, the meaning of life imprisonment in South Africa has
changed over time and particularly in the last 20 years. These changes,
especially since the early 1990s, were the result of two macro-political
forces. On the one hand, was the democratisation of South Africa with
the enactment of a new Constitution, with a progressive Bill of Rights
including the right to life and the right not to be subjected inhumane
and degrading punishment or treatment. Pulling in the other direction,
was government’s reaction to crime, characterised by its over-emphasis
on punishment and retribution. By 31 October 2008, South Africa’s pris-
ons were home to 8634 prisoners serving life sentences.3 In the last 10
2 Diemont JA observed in S v Qeqe and another 1990 (2) SACR 654 (CkA) at 659 that
‘[d]oes a ‘‘life sentence’’ mean that the appellants must remain incarcerated in prisons
until they die? The answer is no. It has been widely accepted for many years [in the for
mer Ciskei] that a life sentence will not exceed 25 years and that even 25 years is an ex
ceptionally long sentence. . . [section] 18(1)(b) of the Police and Prisons Act 36 of 1983
(Ck) provided that any person sentenced under the provisions of any law to imprison
ment for life, shall be detained in a prison for a period not less than 10 years and not
more than 25 years.’ In S v Siluale en ander 1999 (2) SACR 102 (SCA) at 103 the Court
observed that ‘[i]f the circumstances of a case require that an offender should receive a
sentence which for all practical purposes removes him permanently from society, life
imprisonment is the only appropriate sentence. It is intended to be the most severe sen
tence that can be imposed, although there are acknowledged procedures which make
parole possible in appropriate circumstances, eg where the offender (contrary to all ex
pectations) genuinely reforms.’
3 See http://www.dcs.gov.za/WebStatistics/, accessed on 1 December 2008.
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years South African courts sentenced more people to life imprisonment
than they had done in the previous century.4 The meaning of life impri-
sonment has also changed drastically during this period. The increase in
the number of prisoners serving life and the consequent changes in the
meaning of life imprisonment did not happen without reason, and this
issue will be interrogated in this article.
2. Life imprisonment during the period of the imposition of
the death penalty (1906-1994)
Life imprisonment has been part of the South African legal system for
many decades. South African case law indicates that as early as the
beginning of the 20th century, courts started granting divorce decrees
based on the fact that one spouse proved that the other was serving a
life sentence. In Nefler v Nefler5 the High Court of the Orange Free State
was petitioned by Mrs Nefler for a divorce decree on the ground that
Mr Nefler had been found guilty of assault with intent to cause grievous
bodily harm and ‘sentenced to be imprisoned and kept to hard labour
for the term of his natural life’.6 The Court held that ‘[e]quity will demand
that . . . in this case where the man is imprisoned for life’ it necessitated
the granting of ‘a divorce on the ground of imprisonment for life’.7 The
reasoning in Nefler v Nefler would later be followed in the cases of Jooste
v Jooste (1907)8, Van Broemsen v Van Broemsen (1933)9 and Smith v
Smith (1943).10 From these cases it is also clear that in the early 20th
century courts rarely imposed life imprisonment. In all the cases cited
above, except Nefler v Nefler, the defendants had been sentenced to
death and their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. It is also
important to note that life imprisonment in South Africa in the late 19th
century and the early 20th century was not as long as the terms would
later become in the first decade of the 21st century. It was reported by
one of the prison officers in the early 20th Century that the longest per-
iod he had known for a person to have served life imprisonment was
20 years and that in one case a prisoner who had been sentenced to life
imprisonment served only one year and two months.11 In R v Mzwakala
the Court observed that there were ‘two Government Notices (GN 1551
4 In 1995 there were 443 prisoners serving life sentences in South Africa. See C Giffard &
L Muntingh The Effect of Sentencing on the Size of the South African Prison Population
(2006) 10.
5 Nefler v Nefler (1906) ORC 7.
6 Nefler supra (n5) at 7.
7 Nefler supra (n5) at 12.
8 Jooste v Jooste (1907) 24 SC 329.
9 Van Broemsen v Van Broemsen (1933) SR 58.
10 Smith v Smith (1943) CPD 50.
11 Jooste supra (n8) 330.
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of the 8th September 1911, and GN 286 of the 28th February, 1936) in
terms of which a sentence of imprisonment for life [was] deemed for the
purposes of remission to be a sentence of imprisonment for twenty
years’.12 However, the Court observed in 1968 that
‘[T]he provisions of those Government Notices were, however, subsequently
repealed. No such provision [was] to be found in the consolidated regulations
issued under sec. 94 of the Prisons Act of 31st December 1965 (published
under Government Notice R 2080 in Regulation Gazette 604 of that date)
which repealed all prior regulations governing remission of sentences or
release of prisoners on parole or on probation.’13
It appears that even before 1965, when the above-mentioned govern-
ment notices were repealed, the meaning and length of life imprison-
ment was determined by the Executive. For example, a person
sentenced to life imprisonment (or whose death sentence was commuted
to life imprisonment), or sentenced to another term of imprisonment
under section 41(2) of the Prisons and Reformatories Act,14 was required
to serve both the life sentence, which was always fixed, and the addi-
tional sentence of imprisonment imposed for another offence, unless the
court ordered otherwise. For example, in November 1945 in Attwood v
Minister of Justice and Another, the applicant was sentenced to death in
addition to 10 years’ imprisonment. The Governor-General-in-Council
commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment in terms of which,
according to the Prisons Board, ‘the Executive Council had decided that
the life imprisonment sentence should be determined as imprisonment
for a period of 30 years’.15 After serving 14 years and 2 months of the
30-year sentence, the prison authorities did not release him, as they
opined that he was supposed to serve 40 years, since the 10-year sen-
tence had to run consecutively with the life sentence of 30 years.
Attwood applied to the court and argued that he was entitled to be
released, as the 10-year sentence ran concurrently with the life sentence.
The Court dismissed his application, holding that this was not the legal
position.
The Attwood case shows that in practice it was up to the Governor to
determine what life imprisonment meant and that the prison authorities
12 R v Mzwakala 1957 (4) SA 273 (A) at 278.
13 S v Masala 1968 (3) SA 212 (A) at 216 7.
14 Act 13 of 1911. Section 41(2) provided that ‘when a person receives more than one sen
tence of imprisonment or additional sentences while serving a term of imprisonment,
each such sentence shall be served the one after the expiration, setting aside, or remis
sion of the other in such order as the Director may determine, unless the court specifi
cally direct otherwise, or unless the court direct that such sentences shall run
concurrently’: As reproduced in Viljoen v Minister of Justice and Another 1948 (3) SA
994 (T) at 997.
15 Attwood v Minister of Justice and Another 1960 (4) SA 911 (T) at 912.
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had to await the decision of the Executive Council on the meaning of life
imprisonment; that life imprisonment was a fixed sentence; and that a per-
son sentenced to life imprisonment was entitled, through earning credits
as a result of good industry, to the remission of the sentence like any other
prisoner serving a fixed sentence (which meant that the prisoner could
serve less than half of the equivalent prison term). Further, a person sen-
tenced to life imprisonment could be sentenced to an additional imprison-
ment term or terms and the sentences would run consecutively.
However, the 1959 Correctional Services Act16, under s 32(2) read
together with s 97(2), provided that any determinate sentence imposed
had to run concurrently with a life sentence. Nevertheless, the Act did
not stipulate what a life sentence meant in practical terms. This led
courts to conclude that the 1955 Criminal Procedure Act, which provided
for the sentence of life imprisonment ‘containe[d] no indication that the
duration of such a sentence [was] to be anything other than that con-
veyed by the plain meaning of the words ‘‘imprisonment for life’’ ’.17
Thus, by 1968, persons sentenced to life imprisonment were released in
line with section 64(1) of the Prisons Act18 in terms of which the Prison
Board submitted a report to the Commissioner of Prisons recommending
the release of the prisoner. The Commissioner would submit such a
report to the Minister of Prisons who had the discretion to authorise the
release of the prisoner on parole. The practice at the time was that such
a report was submitted after a prisoner had served ten years.19 Effec-
tively this meant that a person sentenced to life imprisonment could be
released after 10 years.
The 1960s saw South African courts becoming increasingly punitive
due, presumably, to political instability. This punitive attitude was evi-
dent in the manner in which courts approached sentencing. Dugard, a
celebrated South African legal scholar, observed that ‘since the early
1960’s [sentences in general] have been more severe than those imposed
in other periods of South African history’.20 He adds that during this per-
iod, ‘the number of sentences of life imprisonment imposed has been
great.’21 After giving a summary of prisoners sentenced to life imprison-
ment in South Africa, Dugard cites one case which shows that some
South African judges did not want prisoners sentenced to life imprison-
ment to be released.
In S v Tuhadeleni and others22 the trial judge, Ludorf J, sought to
16 J Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978).
17 Act No 8 of 1959.
18 S v Masala supra (n13) at 216.
19 Act 8 of 1959.
20 Masala supra (n13) at 216 8.
21 Dugard op cit at 239 40.
22 S v Tuhadeleni and others 1969 (1) SA 153 (A).
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emphasize that such sentences were really ‘for life’ when he sentenced
the prisoners to ‘imprisonment for the rest of their natural lives’, but on
appeal it was held that such a formulation could only mean imprison-
ment for life and could not exclude the power of the authorities, acting
on recommendation from a prison board, to release a person serving a
sentence of life imprisonment.23
The punitive nature of the South African courts in the 1960s is also
evidenced by the statistics on people sentenced to both death and life
imprisonment before and after that, as shown in Chart 1.
Chart 124
Chart 1 shows that between 1947 and 1970 courts consistently imposed
more death penalties than life sentences. From 1949 to 1994 there was a
maximum of 50 offenders sentenced to life imprisonment in any one
year. It also appears that the number of offenders sentenced to death
and the number sentenced to life imprisonment mirror each other in
broad terms, often with a few years delay. This could be a result of
death penalty sentences being commuted to life imprisonment. Both sen-
tences saw a spike in the early 1960’s but then declined until the early
1970’s. In contrast to the previous spike, death penalties imposed
climbed sharply from the early 1970’s but the number of life sentences
imposed remained stable and low for the next 20 years. It was only
from 1990 onwards that the number of offenders sentenced to life impri-
sonment started to increase and in 1994/5 the numbers shot above the
historical ceiling of 50 cases per year, as a result of the abolition of the
death penalty in 1995/6. It is also interesting to note that, despite the
democratisation of South Africa since 1990, there was an initial drop in
23 Dugard op cit (n16) at 240.
24 The data presented in Chart 1 is based on numerous government reports dating back to
1949. For detailed statistics see Appendix 2.
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the number of death sentences imposed, but that numbers quickly
climbed back to the historical average of 150 cases per year, until the
death penalty was finally abolished.
Before section 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act was amended by the
1990 Criminal Law Amendment Act25, ‘where an accused had been con-
victed of murder and the court found no extenuating circumstances, it
was obliged to impose the death penalty’.26 Put differently, before the
aforementioned amendment, the death penalty, as an ultimate sentence,
was obligatory for murder.27 Terblanche argues that the ‘final major
overhaul’ of the death penalty before it was abolished in 1995 ‘was
effected through the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1990’.28 Du Toit el
al illustrate that although the death penalty could still be imposed after
the 1990 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act, in cases of murder,
courts were now not required to establish whether there were no ‘exten-
uating circumstances,’ but rather whether there were ‘mitigating or aggra-
vating factors’.29 This was a positive development in that many offenders
who would otherwise have been sentenced to death in the absence of
extenuating circumstances could now be sentenced to lesser sentences
such as life imprisonment. ‘[T]he term ‘‘mitigating factor’’ ha[d] a wider
connotation than an extenuating circumstance and [could] include factors
unrelated to the crime, such as the accused’s behaviour after the crime
he ha[d] committed or the fact that he ha[d] a clean record.’30 In other
words, after the 1990 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act, the
death penalty for murder became discretionary and could only be
imposed when it was ‘the only proper sentence’.31
Much as the government was tough on crime and the courts were
punitive before the 1990s, Terblanche argues that ‘life imprisonment was
expressly inserted into section 276 of the [Criminal Procedure] Act by the
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1990’. But that even before then the
‘supreme courts’ had ‘always been empowered to impose it’.32 Du Toit
25 Amendment to section 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act by section 4 of the Criminal
Law Amendment Act, Act 107 of 1990.
26 E Du Toit Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (1993) s 277. The death penalty
could be, and indeed was, imposed and offenders were executed for other serious of
fences such as rape. See Dugard op cit (n16) at 124 130.
27 Du Toit op cit at 277 (28 11).
28 S Terblanche Guide to Sentencing in South Africa (2007) 434.
29 Du Toit op cit (n26) at 277.
30 Ibid. Footnotes omitted.
31 Ibid.
32 Terblanche supra (n28) at 232. Footnotes omitted. It has also been argued that ‘life im
prisonment was expressly inserted into section 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act by
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990, although it was available to the High
Courts before that as well’: See JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook (8ed)
(2007) 290.
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et al are of the view that the reason why ‘[s]ection 276(1)(b) was
amended to read imprisonment, including imprisonment for life,’ was to
ensure that ‘where the court imposed the sentence of life imprisonment,
it would be the manifest intention that the offender should be removed
from society for the rest of his life. . .’ unless released by the Minister of
Correctional Services.33 However, it should be recalled that as early as
1955, life imprisonment was expressly recognised in the Criminal Proce-
dure Act.34 Much as the supreme court had the discretion to impose life
sentences during the time of the death penalty, and indeed some offen-
ders were sentenced to life imprisonment, Terblanche reminds us that:
‘Until the early 1990s more than 25 years’ imprisonment was rarely imposed in
South Africa, and it was a basic principle that such longer sentences should be
imposed only in cases of exceptional severity. At that stage the death penalty
was still regularly imposed for the most serious crimes and life imprisonment
almost non existent.’35
Joubert et al argue that during the period when the death penalty was
still lawful in South Africa, ‘life imprisonment was considered to be a
valuable alternative to the death sentence and was imposed in cases of
extreme seriousness . . . but where the death penalty was not considered
to be the only proper sentence.’36
33 Du Toit op cit (n26) at s 277 (chapter 28 at 14A). Footnotes omitted. Emphasis in original.
34 Act 56 of 1955. Section 334(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1955 provided that ‘[a]
person liable to a sentence of imprisonment for life or for any other period, may be
sentenced to imprisonment for any shorter period. . .’ as reproduced in CWH Lansdown
South African Criminal Law and Procedure 6th ed (1957) Vol 1 877; see also AV Lans
down Outlines of South African Criminal Law and Procedure 5ed (1960) 284. In Masa
la supra (n13) at 216 the Court observed that ‘[a] sentence of imprisonment for life
[was] referred to in sec.334 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 56 of 1955.’
35 Terblanche op cit (n28) at 222. However, as early as 1960, when the Court was con
fronted with the question of the meaning of life imprisonment, it was observed that
‘[t]he Chairman of the Transvaal Prison Board informed the Court that, generally speak
ing, his board would only make a recommendation for release on a parole [of a prison
er serving a life sentence] after the prisoner had completed at least ten years of his
sentence, while a recommendation for release on probation might only be given after
he had completed 12 years of his sentence. Certain statistics covering the last five years,
furnished to the Court by the Commissioner [of Prisons], indicate[d] that, while releases
during that period [had] in contrast with former years some times occurred before
the prisoner [had] served ten years, the majority [had] been required to serve at least
ten years before being released on parole or probation and, in a number of cases, con
siderably longer.’ See S v Masala supra (n13) at 218. One has to recall that as at 31 De
cember 1947, there were 204 prisoners serving life sentences in South Africa. See
Statistics of Criminal and other Offences and of Penal Institutions for the Year ended
31st December, 1947, Special Report No 178, (Government Printer, Pretoria) Table 34(c)
Race and Sex of Sentenced Offenders in Penal Institutions According to the Nature
of Sentence, as at 31st December 1947.
36 Joubert op cit (n32) at 290 1. In S v Shabalala and others 1991 (2) SACR 478 (A) the ac
cused murdered an elderly recluse and mutilated and partially burnt his body and occu
pied his house. The court in sentencing them to death held that even life imprisonment
was not an appropriate sentence in the circumstances.
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The following examples from the case law, in which life imprisonment
was imposed during this period, demonstrates some of the factors that
courts took into consideration in ‘cases of extreme seriousness’ to
impose life imprisonment instead of the death penalty: where the court
thought that the accused was ‘to be imprisoned for the rest of her life’ in
the sense that like the death penalty, life imprisonment would perma-
nently remove him from society;37 where the appellant was young, had
no previous criminal record, and committed murder while intoxicated;38
and where there was a ‘reasonable prospect’ of the appellant’s rehabilita-
tion.39 Courts also imposed life imprisonment because the appellant was
unlikely to commit murder again as the circumstances that led him to
commit such murder were unlikely to happen again;40 because the
appellant was immature;41 and because the offender had no previous
record for ‘serious’ convictions and none of the victims of his rapes suf-
fered severe or prolonged psychological effects.42 Courts also considered
the fact that the interests of justice demanded the imposition of a life
sentence instead of a death penalty, for example where the prisoner’s
detention would enable the prison authorities to treat him for his mental
condition43 and where the murder had not been accompanied by cruel
and humiliating acts.44
37 S v Phillips and another 1985 (2) SA 727(N) at 747.
38 Masala supra (n13) at 215.
39 S v Sampson 1987 (2) SA 620 (A).
40 See S v Cele 1991(1) SACR 627 (A) in which the appellant, a 40 year old man, had paid
two young men to murder his former employee who had caused trouble for his busi
ness which led him to lose his customers.
41 S v Cotton 1992 (1) SACR 531 (A).
42 S v D 1991 (2) SACR 543 (A). Where the accused was found guilty of various crimes, in
cluding six counts of rape (in which some of his victims contracted sexually transmitted
diseases), one count of attempted rape and one count of indecent assault. See also S v
P 1991 (1) SA 517 (A) where the court set aside the death penalty that had been im
posed on the appellant and substituted it with life imprisonment on the grounds, among
others, that the women the appellant had raped were not virgins, that they had not ex
perienced serious psychological problems as a result of rapes, and that the appellant
could be rehabilitated during his long term of imprisonment. In S v W 1993 (2) SACR 74
(A) the Court substituted the appellant’s death sentence for life imprisonment on
amongst other grounds that the victim of his rape had suffered no serious physical inju
ries.
43 S v Lawrence 1991(2) SACR 57 (A) at 59 where the appellant, a psychopath with pre
vious convictions, had murdered a 19 year old girl, the court in sentencing him to life
imprisonment and held that there was ‘no doubt that if the Court sentences a person
suffering from severe psychopathy to life imprisonment the prison authorities would
take active and adequate steps to ensure that he was appropriately detained and trea
ted. In any event the failure to do so, for whatever cause, does not commend itself. . .as
a reason, in itself, for imposing the [death] penalty.’
44 S v Mdau 1991 (1) SA 169 (A).
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In cases of murder, the circumstances under which it was committed
and the accused’s level of participation were important factors in deter-
mining whether the accused should be sentenced to life imprisonment
or to death. Where the circumstances were not cruel and the accused
had not directly participated in the murder, life imprisonment was
imposed;45 where the accused, though found guilty of murder with no
extenuating circumstances was close to 80 years’ old, the court held that
society did not expect such an old person to be sentenced to death and
sentenced the accused to life imprisonment, even though the two co-
accused who were younger and were sentenced to death.46 The fact that
a dangerous accused may be released on parole if sentenced to life
imprisonment did not justify the imposition of a death penalty on him.47
However, it should be stressed that in most cases where the accused
were sentenced to life imprisonment instead of to death, the youthful-
ness of the accused was highlighted. For example, in S v Bosman,
although the court observed that the ‘nature and circumstances of the
murder . . . [were] so heinous’ and that retributive and deterrent elements
were decisive and the death penalty the only appropriate sentence, the
accused was sentenced to life imprisonment.48
The above cases show that one factor alone, for example, the youth-
fulness of the offender, was normally not sufficient for the court to
depart from imposing the death penalty. Courts had to consider other
factors such as the prospect of rehabilitation, whether the accused had
previous criminal records, and the nature of the crime. A closer examina-
tion of the cases above in which the accused were sentenced to life
imprisonment instead of to death, also shows that most of these were
decided in the early 1990s. As mentioned earlier, the amendment to the
Criminal Procedure Act in 1990 gave courts the discretion to impose a
life sentence in cases that would otherwise have attracted the death pen-
alty.49 In all the cases from the 1990s cited above, courts, before senten-
cing the accused to life imprisonment, referred to s 4 of the Criminal
Law Amendment Act. 50
For example, the court observed:
‘[The] provisions [of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of 1990] brought
about a radical change in the law relating to death sentences. The effect
thereof has been considered in a number of judgments. . . Broadly speaking
the following principles have emerged from these judgments. The imposition
of the death sentence is no longer, as in the past, mandatory in certain circum
45 S v Mthembu 1991 (2) SACR 144 (A).
46 S v Munyai and others 1993 (1) SACR 252 (A).
47 S v Oosthuizen 1991 (2) SACR 298 (A).
48 S v Bosman 1992 (1) SACR 115 (A) at 116.
49 See nn 21 35.
50 Act 107 of 1990.
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stances, but rests entirely in the discretion of the trial Judge. This discretion is
exercised with due regard to the presence or absence of any mitigating or
aggravating factors (as found by the trial Court). The death sentence is only
authorised where the trial Judge is satisfied that it is ‘the proper sentence’,
which has been interpreted to mean ‘the only proper sentence’. Its imposition
is therefore to be confined to exceptionally serious cases cases where the
death sentence ‘is imperatively called for’’’.51
What should also be noted about the above cases is that the accused
had either committed murder combined with robbery with aggravating
circumstances or combined with rape. After 1990, even in cases where
the accused was found guilty of murder with no extenuating circum-
stances, courts held that they could not sentence the offender to death
because the death penalty was not the only appropriate sentence. This
was mostly after courts had considered factors such as the manner in
which, and the purpose for which, the murder was committed, the age
of the accused, whether the accused was capable of rehabilitation and
whether the objectives of punishment would be achieved and the inter-
ests of society protected by imposing a life sentence instead of the death
penalty. In cases of rape, on the other hand, an accused was more likely
to be sentenced to life imprisonment instead of to death when in the
opinion of the court the victim did not sustain serious physical or psy-
chological injuries as a result of the rape.52 This paper does not discuss
the circumstances under which prisoners serving life sentence were
being released before 1995, as Van Zyl Smit has dealt with this question
exhaustively.53
3. Life imprisonment in the aftermath of the abolition of the
death penalty (1995-1997)
The discussion on life imprisonment in the aftermath of the Makwa-
nyane decision, in which the Constitutional Court declared the death
penalty unconstitutional, is divided into two parts. The first part deals
with what is called ‘The Constitutional Court supervised life sentences’
and the second part with the ordinary life sentences. The first part deals
with the death sentences imposed prior to 1994 but not executed and
consequently commuted to various prison sentences, including life impri-
sonment. The second part analyses cases in which courts imposed life
51 S v Mthembu supra (n45) at 145.
52 Statements and sentiments of this nature would in due course, rightly, attract the ire of
gender rights activists.
53 Dirk Van Zyl Smit South African Prison Law and Practice (1992) 378 80; and also
135 9. See also S v Bull and another; S v Chavulla and others 2002 (1) SA 535 (SCA)
at para 23.
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imprisonment as it was the severest sentence available following the
abolition of the death penalty in 1995.
3.1 The Constitutional Court supervised sentences
On 6 June 1995, in the famous Makwanyane case,54 the Constitutional
Court declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional on the grounds
that it violated the right to life and the right not to be subjected to cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.55 The Court ordered,
amongst other things, that all death sentences be ‘set aside in accordance
with the law, and substituted by appropriate and lawful punishments’.56
In dismissing the Attorney General’s argument that the death penalty
was the most deterrent sentence, the Court emphasised that life impri-
sonment was an equal deterrent to the death penalty.57 However, it took
Parliament another two years to pass the Criminal Law Amendment
Act58 the objectives of which included ‘to make provision for the setting
aside of all sentences of death in accordance with the law and their sub-
stitution by lawful punishments’.
Under section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the Minister
of Justice was obliged to ‘as soon as possible after the commencement
of the Act, refer the case of every person who [had] been sentenced to
death and [had] in respect of that sentence exhausted all the recognised
legal procedures pertaining to appeal or review, or no longer [had] such
procedures at his or her disposal, to the court in which the sentence of
death was imposed’. The court had to consist of the judge who had
imposed the death sentence upon the prisoner and if that was not possi-
ble, the Judge President of the court in question was required to desig-
nate any other judge of that court to deal with the matter.59 The court
was required to consider arguments and evidence from, or on behalf of,
the prisoner, before converting the sentence and based on this to ‘advise
the President, with full reasons . . . of the need to set aside the sentence
of death, of the appropriate sentence to be substituted in its place and
if, applicable, of the date to which the sentence shall be antedated’.60
The President was required to set aside the sentence of death and substi-
tute it with the punishment advised by the court.61 All appeals pending
before the Supreme Court against the sentence of death were to be
54 S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).
55 Makwanyane supra (n54) at para 344.
56 Makwanyane supra (n54) at para 150.
57 Makwanyane supra (n54) at para 128.
58 Act 105 of 1997.
59 Section 2.
60 Section 1(3).
61 Section 1(4).
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heard by the full bench of the division which would have heard the
appeal had the Supreme Court directed such a division to hear the
appeal.62 The full bench was empowered to set aside the sentence of
death and substitute it with the appropriate sentence.63 On the other
hand, all appeals that had been partly heard or were pending before the
Supreme Court of Appeal were to be disposed of by that court in terms
of section 322(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act64 with the powers to
substitute death sentences for appropriate sentences.65 Courts were
required to antedate the sentence of imprisonment substituted with the
one of death to a specified date which was not to be earlier than the
date on which the sentence of death was imposed.66
Despite the existence of the legal framework for substituting death
sentences with lawful sentences, the process of dealing with these cases
was slow and eventually gave rise to a constitutional challenge in Sibiya
and others v The Director of Public Prosecutions and others.67 The Con-
stitutional Court lamented the fact that for the preceding 10 years, since
the Makwanyane decision, all death sentences had not yet been con-
verted to other sentences. It ordered the Department of Justice, which
was one of the respondents, to update the Court, within a stipulated
time, on the measures it had taken to convert all the death sentences
and in cases where such sentences had not been converted, to provide
reasons why.68 Table 1 below shows the number of death sentences
converted to life sentences in the light of the Makwanyane decision and
enabled by the above outlined provisions of the Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act.69 The new sentences are also categorised according to the six
different mechanisms for conversion.
62 Section 1(7).
63 Section 1(9).
64 Act No. 51 of 1977. Section 322(2) provides that ‘upon appeal . . . against any sentence,
the court of appeal may confirm the sentence or may delete or amend the sentence
and impose such punishment as ought to have been imposed at the trial’.
65 Section 1(10).
66 Section 1(11).
67 Sibiya and others v the Director of Public Prosecutions and others 2006 (1) SACR 220
(CC).
68 Supra n67 at para 64.
69 As at 5 June 2005, 465 prisoners were on death row in South Africa. As of October
2005, 378 sentences had been converted to other sentences, seven prisoners had died
and 80 prisoners were waiting for their sentences to be converted. The author relies on
the statistics available as of October 2005 because attempts to get the statistics from the
Constitutional Court on what sentences were imposed on the 80 prisoners who were
waiting the conversion of the sentences were not successful. The statistics are based on
the submissions of the Department of Justice to the Constitutional Court for the October
2005 judgment.
Life imprisonment in South Africa: yesterday, today, and tomorrow 13
Table 1
Category Same
judge
Different
judge
SCA to
Court a
quo
SCA Full
bench
SCA s 322
Nr. of prisoners
on death row
123 108 49 68 64 6
Converted to life
imprisonment
74 90 26 63 60 6
Converted to
other terms of
imprisonment
49 18 23 5 4 0
% % % % % %
Converted to life
imprisonment
60.2 83.3 53.1 92.6 93.8 100.0
Converted to
other terms of
imprisonment
39.8 16.7 46.9 7.4 6.3 0.0
Table 1 illustrates that the majority of prisoners who had been sentenced
to death had their sentences converted to life imprisonment (including
those who were sentenced to more than one life sentence) and those
who were not sentenced to life imprisonment were sentenced to prison
terms ranging from 15 to 50 years. However, a prisoner whose sentence
was reviewed by the same judge who had sentenced him to death, or
by the lower court at the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal, stood a
better change of being sentenced to a sentence other than life imprison-
ment than did a prisoner whose sentence was reviewed by the other
four mechanisms.
This raises a question of what the courts consider relevant in convert-
ing most of the death sentences to life imprisonment. The author was
unable to access the High Court decisions in this regard as they were
unreported. However, those of the Supreme Court of Appeal were
accessible and these were used to establish which factors the courts con-
sidered when they converted death sentences to life imprisonment. The
following trends were noted in the cases reviewed: in all cases the Court
reviewed the facts of the case, that is, the nature of the offence com-
mitted by the accused, the personal circumstances of the accused, for
example whether he was capable of rehabilitation or not, the aggravat-
ing and the mitigating factors. When the aggravating factors outweighed
the mitigating factors, which was generally the case, the death penalty
was converted to life imprisonment.70 In the few cases where the death
70 In Khaba v S [1999] JOL 5758 (A) the Supreme Court of Appeal, before converting the
appellant’s death sentence to life imprisonment, held that ‘[i]t had been noted . . .that
the aggravating circumstances were such that only the maximum sentence [of life impri
sonment] was appropriate’. See page 1 of 5758; in Kruger and another v S [1999] JOL
5341(A), the Court observed that ‘[i]n prior proceedings, mitigating and aggravating fac
tors had been considered and Court had concluded that death penalty was the only ap
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penalty was converted to a shorter prison term, like 16 years, the court
held that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors. For
example in Musingadi and others v S, the Court held that the first appel-
lant’s death sentence be converted to 16 years’ imprisonment because of
following mitigating factors: the appellant was relatively young (31 years
old); he was a first offender; he had a wife and a child whom he sup-
ported; his level of education was low (Standard 5); and he had not
played a leading role in the murder and robbery.71
In some cases the Court gave particular attention to the character of
the accused. For example, in Boy and another v S, the sentence of death
was converted to life imprisonment because the Court was of the view
that the appellants ‘were irretrievably beyond any possibility of rehabili-
tation.’72 In December v S, the Court justified the imposition of life sen-
tence on the ground that ‘the appellant’s removal from society should be
permanent and that life imprisonment [was] the only fitting sentence.’73
In Mokoena v S, the court converted the death penalty into life imprison-
ment because, in addition to the offence of which the appellant was
propriate sentence. For these reasons Court considered that life imprisonment was an
appropriate sentence.’; see also Mafumo and another v S [1999] JOL 5342(A); Mashego
v S [1999] JOL 5525(A); Motshwedi v S [1999] JOL 5511(A); Ndgungweni and another v S
[2001] JOL 7324(A); Ngcobo v S [1999] JOL 5731(A); Nkala en ’n ander v S [1999] JOL
5515(A); Nortje v S [1999] JOL 5756(A); Pekeer v S [1999] JOL 5528(A); Rasmeni v S
[1999] JOL 5510(A); Shabalala and another v S [2000] JOL 7270(A); Smith v S [1999] JOL
5730(A); Stotenkamp v S [1999] JOL 5753(A); Swartbooi v S [1999] JOL 5509(A); Van Der
Merwe v S [1999] JOL 5524 (A);Walus and another v S [2001] JOL 7629(A); in Mhlongo v
S [2000] JOL 5891(A) the Court held that "the facts and circumstances of the case war
ranted the imposition of the most extreme sentence available to the courts. The substi
tute sentence now had to be likewise’ the court imposed life imprisonment. In Naidoo v
S [1999] JOL 5340 (A) the Court held that ‘the offence was so heinous that this was a
case in which the destruction of the appellant was imperatively called for. In view of
this it follows that his removal from society should be permanent and accordingly the
possibility of rehabilitation is not a relevant factor . . . [T]he proper sentence in this case
would be one of life imprisonment’ at p 4 of 5340; in Phaleng en andere v S [1999] JOL
4629 (A) the Court in converting the appellant’s sentence from death to life imprison
ment held that its decision had been influenced by ‘constitutional developments regard
ing the death penalty’.
71 Musingadi and others v S [2004] 4 All SA 274 (SCA) at para 52. However, in Nogqala v
S [1999] JOL 5527(A), the Court held that even though the accused was young (30)
years old, was a first offender, came from an impoverished background, and had the
prospect of rehabilitation, his death sentence had to be converted to life imprisonment
because of the callous nature of the murder he had committed. The Court held that in
such a case of heinous murder (the murder of an elderly man in the most brutal of cir
cumstances) the retribution and deterrence objectives of punishment outweighed the
prospect of rehabilitation. See also Plaatjies and another v S [1999] JOL 4626(A) where
the appellant’s death sentence was converted to 30 years’ imprisonment.
72 Boy and another v S [1999] JOL 5392 (A) at 1.
73 December v S [1999] JOL 5508 (A) p 3 of 5508.
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found guilty, a particularly violent murder, the Court also ‘took into
account the fact that the accused also had previous convictions’.74
One could argue that in cases where the Supreme Court of Appeal
dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the sentence and ordered the
lower courts to impose a ‘competent’ or ‘appropriate’ sentence, such
courts had to ensure that the offenders were sentenced to the penalty
that the Supreme Court of Appeal would have imposed had it not
referred the matter to the lower court. This could explain why in such
cases, as illustrated in Table 1 above, the majority of the death penalties
were converted to life imprisonment and in cases where they were not
converted to life imprisonment, lengthy prison terms were imposed. In
Malefane and others v S, for example, the Supreme Court of Appeal,
after dismissing the appellants’ appeal against their conviction for mur-
der, substituted their death sentence with life imprisonment on the
ground that the trial judge who would have been ordered to re-sentence
them had died during the pending of the appeal. The Court held that it
imposed life imprisonment because that was the ‘sentence that the court
a quo would have imposed’ for the purpose of rendering the accused
‘incapable of endangering law and order in the community ever again’.75
One also realises that, like the Supreme Court of Appeal, the full
bench of the High Court weighed the mitigating factors against the
aggravating factors in determining the appropriate sentence that should
be substituted with the death penalty. In Lukhele v S, the full bench of
the Transvaal, before converting the appellant’s sentence from death to
life imprisonment, took into consideration the ‘overwhelming’ aggravat-
ing circumstances and said that it had ‘little sympathy with the appellant’
and sentenced him to life imprisonment which it understood to mean
that the prisoner was to be ‘detained in prison for as long as [the autho-
rities] considered reasonable’.76
3.2 Life sentences not directly supervised by the Constitutional
Court in the aftermath of the abolition of the death penalty
but prior to the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1998
After the abolition of the death penalty, courts that imposed life sen-
tences considered different factors, such as the nature of the offences
and the character of the accused, for the purpose of imposing life impri-
sonment as a sentence. This was because the Criminal Procedure Act77
74 Mokoena v S [1999] JOL 5396 (A) at 1.
75 Malefane and others v S [1998] JOL 2431 (A) at pp 1 and 26.
76 Lukhele v S [2001] JOL 8647 (T) at 5.
77 Act 51 of 1977.
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gave courts wider discretion with regard to the imposition of life sen-
tences. Section 283(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that ‘a per-
son liable to a sentence of imprisonment for life or for any other period,
may be sentenced to imprisonment for any shorter period. . .’ However,
s 283(2) puts a proviso to s 283(1) to the effect that ‘the provision of
subsection (1) shall not apply with reference to any offence for which a
minimum penalty is prescribed in the law creating the offence or pre-
scribing a penalty therefore’. Before 1998 the courts had wide discretion
in deciding who was to be sentenced to life imprisonment. This explains
why, when the minimum sentences legislation was introduced in 1998
directing courts to sentence persons convicted of specified scheduled
offences to life imprisonment unless there were substantial and compel-
ling circumstances for not doing so, some courts felt that their discretion
to determine who was to be sentenced to life imprisonment, or not, had
been eliminated.78
How did the courts exercise their discretion before 1998? In the first
place, the courts considered the nature of the offence that the accused
had committed. If it was a serious offence, such as multiple murders,
courts were more likely to sentence the accused to life imprisonment.79
In Martin v S, where the appellant was convicted of four counts of mur-
der and two counts of attempted murder, the Supreme Court of Appeal
held that life imprisonment ‘must be accountable to the reality that as
equal increments are added to duration of sentence, there comes a point
where the marginal value of a further increment tends to be less than
that of every previous increment. A law of diminishing returns oper-
ates’.80 The Court cautioned that ‘the court must hesitantly exceed the
optimum point for the sake of striving for more or for guaranteed effec-
tiveness. So it is that in this case long imprisonment, but for less than a
lifetime, may not be left out of consideration’.81 The Court was also alive
to the fact that one-size-fits-all life sentences may cause discrepancies
between offenders and that before a life sentence was imposed, factors
such as the age of the offender and his or her likely future contribution
to society could not be ignored. The court held that:
78 See for example S v Dodo 2001 (3) BCLR 279 (E) at 292, where the judge observed that
under s 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, ‘an accused convicted of a serious
charge before the High Court, unless the Court is satisfied that substantial and compel
ling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence, faces a life
sentence which was decided upon before the commencement of the trial, not by the
Court itself, but by the Legislature. . .In my view, this is not a trial before an ordinary
court. It is a trial before a court in which, at the imposition of the prescribed sentence,
the robes are the robes of the judge, but the voice is the voice of the Legislature.’
79 See Martin v S [1998] JOL 268 (W).
80 Martin supra (n79) at 13.
81 Martin supra (n79) at 14.
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‘An approach that life imprisonment is what is appropriate for a bad man com
mitting a bad crime disregards that such a norm tends to create disparity. Life
sentence imposed upon a lively man of 30 imposes a much longer and harsher
sentence than the nominally identical sentence when imposed on a man of 65
who has lost interest in everything around him. Little else but the established
need to use detention as a means of preventing repetition of crime by the
accused can justify ignoring such discrepancies. But there is also an aspect of
cruelness to a life sentence . . . the man who is incarcerated for life does not
have a curtain drawn on awareness. There is no dividing date which ends his
subjective suffering and renders him unaware of the past, or of the futility of
the future. What he is subjected to is an unending punishment, day after day.
It is life without future hope, coupled with a permanence of suffering. It is
extremely unpleasant while it lasts which is interminable.’82
From the above comment one observes that the Supreme Court consid-
ered life imprisonment to be a sentence so severe that before its imposi-
tion the court had to weigh various factors. These factors, as mentioned
earlier, included the heinous nature of the offence committed, the age of
the accused,83 and most importantly, these factors had to be balanced
against the cruel nature of the sentence of life imprisonment — a sen-
tence by which the offender was being punished in ‘an unending’ man-
ner ‘day after day’ which was also ‘coupled with a permanence of
suffering.’ This meant that courts had wider discretion to determine
whether, irrespective of the heinous nature of the offence committed,
the circumstances required the imposition of such a severe sentence.
Thus in S v Matolo en ’n ander the High Court, before sentencing the
accused to life imprisonment for the offence of murder, made it clear
that ‘it had a very wide discretion with regard to the passing of sentence’
but that discretion had ‘to be exercised in a legal or judicial manner at
all times’.84 The Court considered life imprisonment to be the ‘appropri-
ate sentence,’ it gave ‘particular attention’ to the following factors: ‘(i)
the seriousness of the crime; (ii) the personal circumstances of the
accused; and (iii) the interests of the community at large’.85
82 Martin supra (n79) at 14. Emphasis in original.
83 In S v M 1994 (2) SACR 24 (A) the appellant had been sentenced to death for the rape
of an 8 month old baby leading to her death. On appeal, the court substituted his death
sentence to life imprisonment on the grounds that though the offence was callous, the
accused was of young age (20 years old) and committed the offence under the influ
ence of alcohol.
84 S v Matolo en ’n ander [1997] 4 All SA 225 (0) at 225 6.
85 Ibid. In S v Stonga 1997 (2) SACR 497 (O) at 498 where the appellant was found
guilty of the rape and murder of an 8 year old girl in a gruesome manner, that is, he
choked her until she was lifeless, raped her and dumped her, head first, in a toilet.
The court in sentencing him to life imprisonment held that although the appellant
was young (25 years’ old), cooperated with the prosecution and had shown remorse
after his conviction, his personal characteristics had to be ‘subordinated to the inter
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One could conclude that courts considered the following variables or
a combination thereof in deciding whether to impose life imprisonment
or not: the seriousness or otherwise of the offence; the need to protect
the community from the accused;86 the fact that life imprisonment would
achieve the objectives of punishment such as retribution, deterrence and
protection of the society;87 the extent to which the crime the accused
committed was prevalent in society in that, where the offence was ser-
ious and prevalent the accused was more likely to be sentenced to life
imprisonment;88 the conduct of the accused in committing the offence
and ‘whether the conduct of an accused in, during and preceding the
commission of the offence was of so grave and repulsive a nature, that
the community has to be protected against the onslaughts of such an
unscrupulous aggressor by his removal from society for the rest of his
life’.89
In some cases, even if the accused committed offences such as murder
and robbery and was vengeful, courts avoided life imprisonment or
‘extremely long sentences’ such as 60 years imprisonment because of
the ‘law of diminishing returns’.90 In S v De Kock the court sentenced the
accused to life imprisonment because, amongst other grounds, he was
not susceptible to rehabilitation.91 Life imprisonment was also imposed
in cases so serious that they demanded the imposition of the ‘heaviest
sentence permissible’ and these were cases where, for example, the
accused played a leading role in the commission of a heinous offence,
and where there were no mitigating factors for the court to impose a les-
ser sentence.92 In the same vein, life imprisonment was avoided if the
imposition of a lesser sentence would accord with the ‘notions of fair-
ness and equity’.93
ests of society’ and the latter required that he had to be effectively and permanently
removed from society and that to achieve that life imprisonment was the only avail
able sentence.
86 S v Ngcongo and another 1996 (1) SACR 557 (N).
87 Ibid.
88 S v Matolo en ’n ander 1998 (1) SACR 206 (O) 208.
89 Ibid.
90 S v Naryan [1998] JOL 4132 (W) at 47. Where the accused was sentenced to 27 years
for various offences which included murder, car robberies, and the unlawful possession
of a firearm and ammunition.
91 S v De Kock 1997 (2) SACR 171 (T).
92 S v Magoro 1996 (2) SACR 359 (A) at 365. Where the accused were found guilty of
burning to death an old woman whom they suspected of being a witch, one of them
was sentenced to life imprisonment because he had played a leading role in the mur
der. In S v Van Wyk 1997 (1) SACR 345 (T) at 347 where the accused, aged 21 years’
old, was found guilty of committing various murders and sentenced to life imprison
ment, the court in justifying the imposition of the sentence, placed emphasis on the hei
nous nature of the offences committed and on the fact that ‘the appellant had not
shown any real remorse particularly in respect of the murders’.
93 Magoro supra n92 at 365.
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Another important factor that influenced sentencing in the aftermath
of the abolition of the death penalty was the manner in which some
courts imposed excessively long prison terms on the offenders to pre-
vent them from being considered for parole on the basis that, because
of the callous nature of the offences they had committed, they would
have been sentenced to death had it not been declared unconstitutional.
Put differently, courts were aware that if they sentenced offenders to life
imprisonment, they would be considered for parole after serving a cer-
tain number of years in prison. In an effort to prevent their release,
courts imposed sentences that were longer than actual life sentences.94
In reacting to this sentencing trend, the High Court observed in S v
Smith, where the accused was found guilty of murdering his employer,
his employer’s wife and daughter, that it was ‘inappropriate, when con-
sidering a proper sentence, to take into account that the death penalty
would be the appropriate sentence if it had been available as a senten-
cing option’ and the court added that it was ‘similarly inappropriate for
the court to impose lengthy, non-concurrent periods of imprisonment in
an attempt to eliminate any possibilities of parole’.95
3.3 The release of prisoners serving life sentences
In 1996 the Department of Correctional Services published its Release
Policy in the Government Gazette in which it stipulated that a prisoner
sentenced to life imprisonment was to be considered for parole after ser-
ving at least 20 years of the sentence or, once he had reached the age of
65 years, after serving 15 years.96 In the following year, the Parole and
Correctional Supervision Amendment Act (PCSAA)97 amended s 65(5)
and (6) of the Correctional Services Act by providing under section
9(d)(v) that a prisoner serving a life sentence shall not be released on
parole before serving at least 25 years of the sentence. However, the
same section included a proviso to the effect that parole could be
granted to a prisoner who reached the age of 65 years while serving his
sentence on condition that such a prisoner had served at least 15 years
94 For example in Mhlakaza and others v S [1997] 2 All SA 185 (A) the accused were con
victed of a number of offences including the murder of a police officer. The first ac
cused was sentenced to an ‘effective’ sentence of 47 years and the second to 38 years.
The reason the court gave for such sentences was that they would serve as a deterrent
to potential criminals.
95 S v Smith 1996 (1) SACR 250 at 251.
96 See the Department of Correctional Services Release Policy published in Government
Gazette 17386 of 30 August 1996 by Notice 1222 of 1996 as referred to in S v Bull and
another; S v Chavulla and others 2002 (1) SA 535 (SCA) at para 23.
97 Act 87 of 1997 (assented to by the President on 26 November 1997 and came into force
on 12 December 1997. See Government Gazette 18503).
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of his prison term.98 The PCSAA also substituted s 63 of the Correctional
Services Act to give the parole board the following functions in relation
to prisoners serving life sentences:
Section 63(2) ‘A parole board shall, in respect of any prisoner serving a sen
tence of life imprisonment, submit a report with recommendations on the pos
sible placement of the prisoner concerned on parole or on day parole, and the
conditions under which the prisoner may be so placed to the court which sen
tenced the prisoner.’
The PCSAA also inserted s 64B(1) into the Correctional Services Act
which gave the court (to which the report mentioned in s 63(2) was to
be submitted) the power to ‘order that the prisoner concerned be placed
on day parole and determine the conditions on which the prisoner shall
be so placed.’ Section 64B(2) provided that should the court decide that
a prisoner serving a life sentence ‘should not be placed on parole or day
parole, it shall determine the period of imprisonment which the prisoner
shall serve before the prisoner may again be considered for placement
on parole or on day parole’. Therefore, prisoners who were sentenced
to life imprisonment before 12 December 1997, the date on which the
PCSAA came into force, are governed by the law and policies which
were operational during that time, that is, s 65 of the Correctional Ser-
vices Act and the 1996 Release Policy. This fact is also acknowledged
under s 24 of the PCSAA which provides that any person serving a
prison sentence immediately before the commencement of the PCSAA
shall have his sentence and release governed by the law that was in
place at the time he was sentenced. Consequently the PCSAA governs
those offenders who were sentenced to life imprisonment on or after 12
December 1997. In practice, the first prisoner serving a life sentence
whose parole is governed by the 1996 Release Policy will have to be
considered for release in 2016 and the one whose parole is governed by
the PCSAA will have to be considered for release in 2022.
4. Life imprisonment in the minimum sentences legislation
era (imposed by High Courts) 1998-2007
The Criminal Law Amendment Act, or the minimum sentences legislation
(MSL), as it became popularly known, has been a subject of various stu-
dies and reports.99 Its drafting history and impact on the prison popula-
tion in general are beyond the scope of this article. It was meant to be
98 S v Bull; S v Chavulla supra n96 at para 23.
99 See for example Michael O’Donovan and Jean Redpath The Impact of Minimum Senten
cing in South Africa (2006) Open Society Foundation for South Africa (Report 2).
C Giffard and L Muntingh The Effect of Sentencing on the Size of the South African Pris
on Population (2006) Open Society Foundation for South Africa (Report 3).
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short-lived as a ‘response to a situation which was hoped would not per-
sist indefinitely’ but that the ‘situation does and remains notorious’.100
The situation was and still is the ‘alarming burgeoning in the commission
of the crimes of the kind specified [in the MSL] resulting in the govern-
ment, the police, prosecutors and the courts constantly being exhorted
to use their best efforts to stem the tide of criminality which threatened
and continues to threaten to engulf society’.101
Chart 2102
The impact the MSL has had on the number of prisoners sentenced to
life sentences is evident in Chart 2 above. Since the coming into force of
the MSL in 1998, the number of prisoners serving life sentences has
increased dramatically. The skyrocketing in the numbers of prisoners
subjected to life imprisonment between 2000 and 2001 is attributable to
the fact that it was during that period that the majority of death sen-
tences were commuted to life imprisonment. As mentioned earlier, by
end of October 2008, 8634 prisoners were serving life sentences. The
wide discretion that courts had before the coming into force of the MSL
was affected. The Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledges this fact and
100 S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA) at para 7. Under s 53(1) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, the Act was to cease to be law after two years but the President has
the powers to extend its operation. Since its coming into force on 19 December 1997,
the applicability of the Act has been annually renewed and in December 2007 the Act
was amended to, inter alia, give jurisdiction to regional courts to impose life sen
tences (this aspect is discussed in detail below). Also, the requirement of biannual ex
tension has been removed, so that the MSL now assumes a permanent place on the
statute book.
101 S v Malgas supra (n100) at para 7.
102 Statistics acquired from the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons, Cape Town (2006). For the
exact number of prisoners serving life sentences in each year between 1996 and 2007
see Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons, Annual Report for the period 1 April 2007 to 31
March 2008 (2008) at 23 at http://judicialinsp.pwv.gov.za/Annualreports/Annual%20Re
port%202 007 2008.pdf , accessed on 30 November 2008.
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explains why this is the case in the following terms: ‘[i]t was, of course,
open to the High Courts even prior to the enactment of the [minimum
sentences] legislation to impose life imprisonment in the free exercise of
their discretion. The very fact that [the MSL was]. . .enacted indicate[d]
that Parliament was not content with that and that it was no longer to be
‘‘business as usual’’ when sentencing for the commission of the specified
crimes.’103 The coming into force of the MSL meant that courts did not
have their hitherto wide discretion of imposing life sentences when they
deemed it suitable. Differently put, the MSL ensured that ‘court was not
to be given a clean slate on which to inscribe whatever sentence it
thought fit.’104 The law requires courts to approach sentencing in respect
of some of the scheduled offences with the mindset that life imprison-
ment should be the starting point upon conviction unless there are ‘sub-
stantial and compelling’ circumstances to justify the imposition of a
lesser sentence.
Before proceeding to discuss the various ways in which the MSL-era
substantially transformed the institution of life imprisonment in South
Africa, it should also be noted that since 1993 South Africa passed a
range of laws whose breach empowers courts to sentence the offender
to life imprisonment. These laws include: the Non-Proliferation of Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction Act (1993);105 the Defence Act (2002);106 the
Nuclear Energy Act (1999);107 the Implementation of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court Act (2002);108 the Protection of Constitu-
tional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act (2004);109
the Preventing and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (2004);110 and
the Prevention of Organised Crimes Act (1998).111 However, at the time
of writing, December 2008, there was no known case in which an offen-
der had been sentenced to life imprisonment other than in cases of mur-
der and rape. One could argue that whereas under all the
aforementioned pieces of legislation a court could sentence an offender
to life imprisonment, in practice it is the MSL which has been enforced.
4.1 The constitutional challenge to the MSL
South African case law attests to the fact that as early as 1943 some the
103 S v Malgas supra (n100) at para 7.
104 Malgas supra (n100) at para 8.
105 Act 87 of 1993, s 26(1)(k)(v).
106 Act 42 of 2002, s 24(3).
107 Act 46 of 1999, s 56(2)(d).
108 Act 27 of 2002, s 4(i).
109 Act 33 of 2004, s 18(1)(a).
110 Act 12 of 2004, s 26(1)(a).
111 Act 121 of 1998, s 3.
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accused have in general challenged minimum sentencing legislation.
Their arguments have, among other things, been that minimum sen-
tences interfere with the judiciary’s powers to exercise its discretion
when it comes to sentencing.112 The 2001 case of S v Dodo113 challenged
the imposition of the life sentence as a minimum and also maximum
sentence in cases where the accused has been found guilty of one or
more of the scheduled offences in circumstances that do not allow the
court to impose a lesser sentence. In Dodo the issue was whether
s 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (1997), which allows a
judge to sentence an accused found guilty of one or more scheduled
offences, to life imprisonment, unless there are substantial and compel-
ling circumstances, was unconstitutional. It was alleged to violate the
right of everyone to be tried by an ordinary court and also to be incon-
sistent with the separation of powers principle. The Constitutional Court
observed that
‘[t]he construction of the phrase ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ in
s 51(3)(a) goes to the heart of these issues. The existence of these circum
stances permit the imposition of a lesser sentence than the one prescribed.
Establishing their true meaning has proved to be intractably difficult and has
led to a series of widely divergent constructions in the High Courts’.114
This ambiguity was settled by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v
Malgas (discussed below at 4.2). The court held that courts still have a
limited discretion whether to impose a life sentence or not and that such
a discretion depended on the existence or not of substantial and compel-
ling circumstances and that in such a situation the MSL was not unconsti-
tutional. On the separation of powers, the Constitutional Court held that
even though the Constitution recognises this principle, it does not envi-
sage a strict separation of powers but rather one in which one arm of
government, through checks and balances, would check on the functions
and powers of the other but not cripple its functions and that South
Africa will develop its own understanding of separation of powers princi-
ples in due course.115 The MSL therefore remained on the statute books
through the periodical renewals by Parliament.
112 See Rex v Beyers [1943] AD 404 in which the accused unsuccessfully challenged the rea
sonableness of his conviction and sentence under the regulations that imposed a mini
mum sentence of five years on a person found in possession of unauthorized
explosives, the Court (Appellant Division) held (at 410) that ‘. . .it cannot be regarded as
unreasonable in existing circumstances to make a regulation imposing a minimum pen
alty for the possession of unauthorised explosives under a power to provide ‘‘for the
defence of the Union, the safety of the public, the maintenance of public order and the
effective prosecution of the war’’.’
113 S v Dodo 2001 (1) SACR 594 (CC).
114 Dodo supra n113 at para 10.
115 Dodo supra n113 at paras 15 33.
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4.2 What should be taken into consideration before
sentencing a person to life imprisonment?
Under the MSL, a court is required to impose a life sentence on an
accused for committing one or more of the scheduled offences,116 unless
there are substantial and compelling circumstances. Like any other legal
term which is undefined, courts were justified in attributing to the phrase
‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ what they thought to its
meaning.117 Various interpretations were given which the Supreme Court
of Appeal considered to have been ‘discordant’ and to necessitate inter-
vention and guidance on what substantial and compelling circumstances
means.118 Thus in S v Malgas, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that in
determining whether substantial and compelling circumstances exist,
courts have to consider the following factors:
‘(A) Section 51 has limited but not eliminated the courts’ discretion in imposing
sentence in respect of offences referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 2 (or impri
sonment for other specified periods for offences listed in other parts of
Schedule 2); (B) Courts are required to approach the imposition of sentence
conscious that the Legislature has ordained life imprisonment (or the particular
prescribed period of imprisonment) as the sentence that should ordinarily and
in the absence of weighty justification be imposed for the listed crimes in the
specified circumstances; (C) Unless there are, and can be seen to be, truly con
vincing reasons for a different response, the crimes in question are therefore
required to elicit a severe, standardised and consistent response from the
courts; (D)The specified sentences are not to be departed from lightly and for
flimsy reasons. Speculative hypotheses favourable to the offender, undue sym
pathy, aversion to imprisoning first offenders, personal doubts as to the effi
cacy of the policy underlying the legislation and marginal differences in
personal circumstances or degrees of participation between co offenders are to
be excluded; (E) The Legislature has, however, deliberately left it to the courts
to decide whether the circumstances of any particular case call for a departure
from the prescribed sentence. While the emphasis has shifted to the objective
gravity of the type of crime and the need for effective sanctions against it, this
does not mean that all other considerations are to be ignored; (F) All factors
(other than those set out in D above) traditionally taken into account in sen
tencing (whether or not they diminish moral guilt) thus continue to play a
role; none is excluded at the outset from consideration in the sentencing pro
cess; (G) The ultimate impact of all the circumstances relevant to sentencing
must be measured against the composite yardstick (‘substantial and compel
ling’) and must be such as cumulatively justify a departure from the standar
dised response that the Legislature has ordained; (H) In applying the statutory
116 See Appendix 1 to this article.
117 The Supreme Court of Appeal observed that ‘[t]he absence of any pertinent guidance
from the Legislature by way of definition or otherwise as to what circumstances should
rank as substantial and compelling or what should not, does not make the task [of es
tablishing its meaning] any easier.’ See Malgas supra (n100) para 18.
118 Malgas supra (n100) at 1229.
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provisions, it is inappropriately constricting to use the concepts developed in
dealing with appeals against sentence as the sole criterion; (I) If the sentencing
court on consideration of the circumstances of the particular case is satisfied
that they render the prescribed sentence unjust in that it would be dispropor
tionate to the crime, the criminal and the needs of society, so that an injustice
would be done by imposing that sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser sen
tence; [and] (J) In so doing, account must be taken of the fact that crime of
that particular kind has been singled out for severe punishment and that the
sentence to be imposed in lieu of the prescribed sentence should be assessed
paying due regard to the bench mark which the Legislature has provided.’119
The above quotation clearly shows what courts should consider in estab-
lishing whether there are indeed substantial and compelling circum-
stances to justify not imposing a life sentence. Courts have to judge
whether the circumstances of a particular case justify their departure
from imposing a life sentence. This means that courts have to weigh
carefully every important aspect of the case to ensure that if life impri-
sonment is not imposed, there truly are substantial and compelling cir-
cumstances.120 However, if the offender was above the age of 16 but
below the age of 18 at the time the offence was committed, s 51(3)(b)
has been interpreted to mean that life imprisonment should be the
exception. The Supreme Court of Appeal held in Brandt v S that when
sentencing a child offender, the court should be guided by the constitu-
tional and international law principles that any punishment imposed
should be in the best interest of the child offender, that such punishment
should be proportional to the offence committed and that imprisonment
should only be used as measure of last resort and for the shortest time
possible.121 The Court concluded that:
‘The effect of the provision is . . . that section 51(3)(b) automatically gives the
sentencing court the discretion that it acquires under section 51(3)(a) only
where it finds substantial and compelling circumstances. It follows that the
‘‘substantial and compelling’’ formula finds no application to offenders
between 16 and 18. A court is therefore generally free to apply the usual sen
tencing criteria in deciding on an appropriate sentence for a child between the
ages of 16 and 18. As in a case where section 51(3)(a) finds application, the
court in arriving at an appropriate sentence must, however, not lose sight of
the fact that offences of the kind specified in Schedule 2 of the Act have been
119 Malgas supra (n100) at para 25.
120 The Supreme Court of Appeal held that ‘[a]lthough there is no onus on an accused to
prove the presence of substantial and compelling circumstances, it must be so that an
accused who intends to persuade a court to impose a sentence less than that prescribed
should pertinently raise such circumstances for consideration.’ See S v Roslee 2006 (1)
SACR 537 (SCA) at para 33.
121 Brandt v S [2005] 2 All SA 1 (SCA) at para 20.
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singled out by the Legislature for severe sentences. The gravity of the offence
must accordingly receive recognition in the determination of an appropriate
sentence.’122
What emerges here is that in cases of adult offenders, the individualisa-
tion in sentencing as a legal principle is largely being substituted with an
emphasis on substantial and compelling circumstances. The question is
what have the courts considered to be substantial and compelling cir-
cumstances? A look at some of the cases will provide an answer.
Where a 17-year old child committed an offence in circumstances con-
templated under Part 1 of Schedule 2 it was held that the ‘youthfulness
[of the offender] per se is a substantial and compelling circumstance.’123
In S v Ferreira and others124, the first appellant, a woman in an abusive
relationship, contracted the second and third appellants to murder her
partner, believing that his death was the only way she could escape the
abusive relationship. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the belief
that the only way to escape an abusive relationship was to kill her part-
ner was a substantial and compelling circumstance which necessitated
the imposition of a term of imprisonment of six years instead of life
imprisonment. However, the court warned that its ruling was not a
licence to all women in abusive relationships to kill their partners.
Courts have also found the following to be substantial and compelling
circumstances: in a case of rape, where the rape was ‘not one of the
most serious manifestations of rape;’125 the absence of previous convic-
tions; and the fact that the accused had ‘displayed remorse and was a
good candidate for rehabilitation’.126 In S v Riekert where the accused
122 Brandt v S supra n121 para 12. For a brief discussion of this judgment see ‘Do Mini
mum Sentences Apply to Juveniles? The Supreme Court of Appeal Says ‘‘No’’’ Article 40
(2005) Vol 7: 1, 1 2. For the earlier decisions on imposing the life sentence as minimum
sentence on child offenders see Direkteur van Openbare Vervolgings, Transvaal v Mak
wetsja 2004 (2) SACR 1(T); and S v Nkosi 2002 (1) SA 494 (W). The 2007 amendments
to the MSL and how they relate to children are dealt with later in this article.
123 Direkteur van Openbare Vervolgings, Transvaal v Makwetsja 2004 (2) SACR 1(T) at 3.
See also Brandt v S [2005] 2 All SA 1 (SCA)
124 S v Ferreira and others 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA).
125 S v G 2004 (2) SACR 296 (W). However, in S v M 2007 (2) SACR 60 (W) where the ac
cused was found guilty of raping his 14 year old granddaughter on two occasions, the
court in sentencing him to life imprisonment held that the facts that the victim did not
sustain grievous bodily harm and that the accused did not use any force during the rape
were not substantial and compelling circumstances. In S v Ncheche 2005 (2) SACR 386
(W) at 386 the court held that ‘cases of rape may be so serious that, regardless of emo
tional sequelae for complainant, they justify imposition of life imprisonment and finding
of absence of ‘‘substantial and compelling circumstances’’.’
126 S v Malan en ’n ander 2004 (1) SACR 264 (T) at 267. However, in S v Obisi 2005 (2)
SACR 350 (W), where the accused was convicted of murder during the robbery, the
court in sentencing him to life imprisonment held that even if he was young and a first
offender, the brutality with which he committed the offences weighed in favour of a life
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was convicted of murder in circumstances in which the court was justi-
fied in sentencing him to life imprisonment, it was held that his low IQ
was one of the substantial and compelling circumstances.127 The
Supreme Court of Appeal held that the fact that the appellant had a
dependant wife and children and was gainfully employed were substan-
tial and compelling circumstances.128 The Supreme Court of Appeal also
held in S v Thebus and another129 that the fact that the accused had
played a minimal role in the commission of the crime was one of the
substantial and compelling circumstances justifying departure from the
prescribed minimum sentence.130
The inference one draws from the above jurisprudence on substantial
and compelling circumstances is that when a court embarks on the jour-
ney of trying to establish whether such circumstances exist, it weighs the
mitigating factors in the light of the aggravating factors and where the
former outweighs the latter, it is very likely that the court will conclude
that substantial and compelling circumstances do exist. It is also vital to
note that in an attempt to establish whether substantial and compelling
circumstances exist, courts look at the personal circumstances of the
accused, the likely implications of his imprisonment to his dependants,
and most importantly at the nature and circumstances under which the
crime was committed. In cases of rape, courts have sometimes referred
to the effect it had on the victim. If the effect was not ‘that serious’ some
courts have imposed lesser sentences instead of life imprisonment. This
understandably aggrieved women’s rights activists and the MSL was later
to be amended (as discussed shortly) to address this.
4.3 The release of prisoners serving life sentences
In 1998, the new Correctional Services Act was enacted but the provision
relevant to the release only came into force in October 2004. Section
sentence rather than a lesser sentence. See also S v Nkomo 2007 (2) SACR 198 (SCA). In
Rommoko v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (1) SACR 200 (SCA) it was held that
life imprisonment, being the heaviest sentence that could be imposed, it was vital that
the court, in cases of rape, considered the effects of rape on the complainant because
such effects constituted ‘important information’ upon which the court could bases its
finding of whether there were substantial and compelling circumstances.
127 S v Riekert 2002 (1) SACR 566 (T).
128 S v Sikhipha 2006 (2) SACR 439 (SCA). However, in S v Boer en andere 2000 (2) SACR
114 (NC) it was held where the three accused were found guilty of raping a 14 year old
girl that their ‘clean records and youthfulness’ were not substantial and compelling cir
cumstances.
129 S v Thebus and another 2002 (2) SACR 566 (SCA).
130 However, in S v Vuma 2003 (1) SACR 597 (W) the appellant was sentenced to life im
prisonment for murder even though it was proved before court that the following fa
vourable circumstances existed: he was employed; had a family to assist financially; he
attended church regularly; was not a violent person; and had no previous convictions.
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73(6)(b)(iv) provides that a prisoner serving a life sentence ‘may not be
placed on parole until he or she has served at least 25 years of the sen-
tence but a prisoner on reaching the age of 65 years may be placed on
parole if he or she has served at least 15 years of such a sentence.’
Under s 73(5)(a)(ii), read together with s 75(1)(c), before the court
releases the prisoner on parole, such a prisoner’s release has to be
recommended to the court by the Correctional Supervision and Parole
Board.131 The latter, before recommending to the former that a prisoner
may be released on parole, has to study the Case Management Commit-
tee’s report on that prisoner.132 Under s 73(5)(a)(ii) it is for the court to
determine the date on which a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment
on or after 1 October 2004 should be placed on day parole or parole.
Terblanche submits that the above
‘[A]mendments should lay to rest most of the concerns judges may have that
life prisoners will be released early. However, this procedure may not necessa
rily be popular. The judge considering the release of the prisoner will rarely
be the same judge who presided over the trial, simply because of the time that
will have lapsed. This means that the procedure will simply add to the work
load of judges’.133
Under s 136(3)(a) of the Correctional Services Act134 ‘any prisoner ser-
ving a sentence of life imprisonment immediately before [1 October
2004] is entitled to be considered for day parole and parole after he or
she has served 20 years of the sentence’.135 Such prisoners ‘may only be
released on parole by the Minister of Correctional Services, after the
recommendation by the National Council’.136 This means that ‘specific
regard [has] to be given to the interests of society and to the reports of
the parole board’.137 Terblanche adds that with regard to prisoners sen-
tenced to life imprisonment before 1 October 2004,
131 For a brief historical discussion of this provision see A Dissel, A Review of Civilian Over
sight over Correctional Services in the Last Decade (CSPRI Research Paper No 4, 2003)
26 28.
132 Terblanche op cit (n28) at 234.
133 Terblanche op cit at 234 5.
134 The Act deals with transitional arrangements.
135 This provision is subject to confusing interpretation in the light of the fact that immedi
ately before 1 October 2004, there were prisoners serving life sentences whose release
was regulated by the 1997 PCSAA (see detailed discussion under 3.3 above). It is ar
gued that this ambiguity could be escaped by invoking the ‘later in time’ rule which dic
tates that when an earlier legislative provision conflicts with the subsequent legislative
provision, the latter prevails. The effect would be that even prisoners sentenced at the
time when the PCSAA was in force should be released after 20 years instead of 25
years.
136 Terblanche op cit (n28) at 235.
137 Terblanche loc cit.
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‘The discretion really rests with two bodies: the National Council and the Min
ister of Correctional Services. If the [National Council] does not recommend
release, the Minister has no say in the matter. But if the National [Council] . . .
does recommend release, the Minister has the final say and is authorised not
to accept the recommendation. There are, therefore, at least some checks and
balances in the exercise of the discretion. The final responsibility to protect
society lies with the Minister.’138
What one observes is that the parole regime governing prisoners serving
life sentences went through different and at times unclear and confusing
changes. There were prisoners who were serving life sentences each
and every time a new change in the parole regime was effected. This
meant that the Department of Correctional Services had prisoners serving
the same sentence, life imprisonment, but with varying durations/tariffs
and different release procedures and bodies. This, as one would expect,
caused confusion among many prisoners who did not know which pol-
icy applied to them and which body was responsible for their release, or
whether to recommend their release and under what circumstances. This
could explain why there have been various applications before courts in
which prisoners challenged their continued imprisonment arguing that it
was illegal because according to the parole regime that was applicable
at the time of their imprisonment they were entitled to an earlier release
than that contemplated by the relevant authorities.139 The 1998 Correc-
tional Services Act also established a new Parole Board system involving
civilians. One could argue that this added confusion to the existing com-
plex set of rules and procedures.140
5. Life imprisonment after December 2007 and beyond
The 1997 MSL provided, inter alia, that if the Regional Court found the
accused guilty of an offence that required the imposition of a life
138 Terblanche ibid.
139 See for example in S v Matolo en ’n ander 1998 (1) SACR 206 (O) where it was held
that the court does not have jurisdiction to order the Department of Correctional Ser
vices never to release a prisoner serving a life sentence on parole; in Van Vuren v Min
ister of Justice and Constitutional Development and another 2007 (8) BCLR 903 (CC)
the applicant who had been sentenced to life imprisonment petitioned court for his re
lease arguing that the parole policies that applied to him were those that existed at the
time of his sentence in 1992 and not those that were adopted after.
140 See J Sloth Nielsen Submission to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Correc
tional Services relating to Parole and the Proposed Amendments concerning parole in
the Correctional Services Amendment Bill 31 August 2007, at http://www.pmg.org.za/
docs/2007/070905sloth nielsen.htm, accessed on 21 May 2008.
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sentence, it was to commit the accused to the High Court for senten-
cing.141 But if the High Court thought that the accused had been incor-
rectly convicted, it was empowered to re-try the accused, establish guilt
or innocence, and impose the relevant sentence where applicable.142
This meant that the accused had to adduce evidence and the witnesses
had to be summoned again to testify against the accused. This process
had obvious problems. Firstly, it created a backlog of cases in the High
Courts143 and most importantly, witnesses had to repeat evidence given
in the Regional Court. This was especially traumatising for rape victims.
It was observed in S v Gqamana where the High Court before senten-
cing the accused for the rape of a minor had to call the rape victim and
her mother to give the same evidence they had adduced before the
Regional Court that:
‘[i]t is, incidentally, an unfortunate consequence of this legislation that, as hap
pened in this case, it will often be necessary to put the complainant in a rape
case yet again through the unpleasant experience of having to go into the wit
ness box and re live the trauma of the crime by testifying on matters which
are relevant to sentence. Sometimes . . . the complainant will have to travel a
long way in order to do so. However, this is an inevitable result of the appar
ent determination of the legislature to achieve a situation where a man is to
be convicted in one court and sentenced in another. The latter court cannot
reasonably be expected, without having been steeped in the atmosphere of
the trial, to decide whether or not to pass a sentence of imprisonment for life
on a man without making some attempt to immerse itself in that atmosphere.
No doubt that was an unintended consequence which did not occur to Parlia
ment when it passed the Act.’144
Other criticisms were also levelled against the legislation by some courts,
holding that it violated the accused’s right to a fair trial. This was
because the accused was subjected to ‘a two-stage-trial’ when he
appeared before the High Court for the sentencing hearing after his trial
before the Regional Court. It also violated the accused’s right to be tried
within a reasonable time because of the delay between conviction in the
Regional Court and sentencing by the High Court.145 After realising the
141 Section 52(1). It was held in Direkteur van Openbare Vervolgings, Transvaal v Makwets
ja 2004 (2) SACR 1 (T) that regional courts did not have the discretion to determine
whether the offence with respect to which the accused was found guilty justified the
imposition of life imprisonment when such an offence was one listed under Part I of
Schedule 2 or whether substantial and compelling circumstances existed. If the accused
pleaded guilty or was found to have committed the offence under Part I of Schedule 2,
the regional court was supposed to commit the accused to the High Court for senten
cing.
142 Section 52(2) (3).
143 See O’Donovan and Redpath op cit (n99).
144 S v Gqamana 2001 (2) SACR 28 (C) at 33 4.
145 See S v Dzukuda; S v Tilly; S v Tshilo 2000 (2) SACR 51 (W).
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shortcomings of the MSL, Parliament embarked on a process of amend-
ing it. The Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Bill was introduced in
2007146 and passed into law later that year and became the Criminal
Law (Amendment) Act.147
The amendment introduced four fundamental changes with regard to
life imprisonment. The first was that the jurisdiction of the Regional
Courts was extended to empower them to impose life imprisonment.148
The objective of increasing the jurisdiction of the Regional Courts,
according to the Memorandum on the Objects of the Criminal Law (Sen-
tencing) Amendment Bill, was ‘. . .to expedite the finalisation of serious
criminal cases, punish offenders of certain serious offences appropriately,
and to avoid secondary victimisation of complainants, which, inter alia,
happens when vulnerable witnesses have to repeat their testimony in
more than one court’149 and endure cross examination.
The second major amendment relates to the applicability of the mini-
mum sentences to juvenile offenders. Section 51(1) and (2) provides that
‘any person’ who commits one or more of the scheduled offences shall
be sentenced, where applicable, to life imprisonment, unless there are
substantial or compelling circumstances. Section 51(6) provides that sec-
tion 51(1) and (2) do ‘not apply in respect of an accused person who
was under the age of 16 years at the time of the commission of an
offence. . .’ This means that as from the date the Amendment Act came
into force, children above the age of 16 years, even children aged 16
years and one day, who commit the offences under section 51, have to
be sentenced to the prescribed minimum sentences, including life impri-
sonment, unless there are substantial and compelling circumstances. The
amendment is inherently flawed because it is an affront to the children’s
rights and the amendment was challenged in the Transvaal High Court
Division on, inter alia, the following grounds: ‘that subjecting children
to . . .life imprisonment, is in breach of children’s constitutional rights
and in breach of South Africa’s international law obligations.’150 In agree-
ing with the applicant, Potterill AJ of the Transvaal High Court held that
the impugned provision violated s 28 of the South African Constitution
(which requires that a child should only be detained as a measure of last
resort and for the shortest time possible) because it effectively
146 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Bill (B 15 2007).
147 Act 38 of 2007 which came into force on 31 December 2007.
148 Section 51 (1)(a b).
149 See para 2.1
150 See Founding Affidavit in Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development and others paragraph 8. See also paragraph 35 of the Affidavit for the de
tailed arguments relating to the impugned provisions and why they violate the Constitu
tion and international law. Unreported judgment on file with author.
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eliminated the ‘clean slate approach’ which is fundamental in sentencing
children in conflict with the law. In Potterill AJ’s words:
‘. . . with a clean slate approach the Court has many sentencing options to con
sider, although imprisonment is conceivable it is an option of last resort, but
with the Amended Act the Court must start with the minimum sentence of life
imprisonment . . . as an option of first resort and then look to compelling and
substantial circumstances and proportionality. The result will not always be the
same and it is not purely academic. The Amended Act must adhere to the
principles enshrined in the Constitution. . .’151
The third significant change was that of an automatic right to appeal in
cases where a person is sentenced by a Regional Court to life imprison-
ment.152 The fourth regards the manner in which courts interpret sub-
stantial and compelling circumstances in cases of rape. The discussion
above illustrates that some courts have held that where a victim of rape
had not sustained serious physical injuries or psychological effects, this
amounted to substantial and compelling circumstance to justify the impo-
sition of a lesser sentence. The amendment expressly provides, inter
alia, that when imposing a sentence in respect of the offence of rape
‘any apparent lack of physical injury to the complainant’ shall not consti-
tute a substantial and compelling circumstance.153 One needs to ask
whether these amendments will address some of the inherent problems
associated with the implementation of the MSL, such as the case delays
and backlogs in courts and the unlikely possibility that minimum sen-
tences will reduce the violent crime rate in South Africa.154 One would
also need to investigate the likely effect of the amendments on the size
of the South Africa prison population. It is more likely that the number
of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment will increase further when
Regional Courts also impose life sentences. In this scenario the quality of
legal representation of persons facing life imprisonment becomes critical.
151 Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and others
(Case No 11214/08, judgment of 4 November 2008) at para 20.
152 Section 6 (ii).
153 Section 51(3)(aA)(ii). The amendment also provides that that courts should not consider
the following as substantial and compelling circumstances in cases of rape: (i) the com
plainant’s previous sexual history; (iii) an accused person’s cultural or religious beliefs
about rape; or (iv) any relationship between the accused person and the complainant
prior to the offence being committed.
154 For a detailed discussion of the problems associated with the minimum sentence legisla
tion see O’Donovan and Redpath op cit (n99).
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6. The release of prisoners serving life sentences after the
coming into force of the Correctional Services
Amendment Act of 11 November 2008
On 8 November 2008, the South African President assented to the Cor-
rectional Services Amendment Act155 which at the time of writing,
December 2008, was yet to come into force.156 The Act was published
in the Government Gazette on 11 November 2008.157 It should be noted
that when this Act comes into force, it will introduce two fundamental
changes with regard to prisoners serving life imprisonment. In the first
place, the prisoners would cease to be called prisoners but ‘offenders’; a
prison would cease to be called a prison but rather a ‘correctional centre’
and the sentence of life imprisonment would become known as ‘life
incarceration’.158 Secondly, and most importantly, the Amendment Act
provides a different regime under which offenders incarcerated for life
would be released. It is vital to note that it would be the Minister of Cor-
rectional Services (and no longer the Court), on the recommendation of
the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board that decides to parole an
offender incarcerated for life;159 that the duration to be served before an
offender serving a life sentence is released will be determined by
National Council in line with the incarceration framework that it would
develop;160 and that the Amendment Act will be applicable to all prison-
ers sentenced to life imprisonment since 1 October 2004.161 It is appro-
priate to outline below section 78 which details the manner in which
offenders serving life sentences will be released on the coming into
force of the Amendment Act:
78. (1) Having considered the record of proceedings of the Correctional Super
vision and Parole Board and its recommendations in the case of a person sen
tenced to life incarceration, the National Council may . . . recommend to the
Minister to grant parole or day parole and prescribe the conditions of commu
nity corrections in terms of section 52. (2) If the Minister refuses to grant par
ole or day parole in terms of subsection (1), the Minister may make
recommendations in respect of treatment, care, development and support of
the sentenced offender which may contribute to improving the likelihood of
future placement on parole or day parole. (3) Where a Correctional Supervi
sion and Parole Board . . . recommends, in the case of a person sentenced to
life incarceration, that parole or day parole be withdrawn or that the condi
155 Correctional Services Amendment Act 25 of 2008.
156 See section 87 of the Correctional Services Amendment Act for the circumstances under
which the Act will come into force.
157 Government Gazette 31593 Vol 521 11 November 2008.
158 See ss 73, 75, and 78.
159 Section 78.
160 Section 73A.
161 Sections 85 and 136(4).
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tions of community corrections imposed on such a person be amended, the
Minister, on advice of the National Council, must consider and make a deci
sion upon the recommendation. (4) Where the Minister refuses or withdraws
parole or day parole the matter must be reconsidered by the Minister, on
advice of the National Council, within two years.
Two important features, amongst others, should be noted here with
regard to section 78. First of all, the Minister, when he refuses to release
the offender on parole, has discretion (in s 78(2) the word ‘may’ instead
of ‘shall’ is used) to make recommendations to ensure that that offender
attends or participates in programmes that would improve his chances
of being placed on parole in the near future. One could argue that if
the Minister’s refusal to place an offender on parole is based on the rea-
son that the offender has to participate in a particular rehabilitation pro-
gramme, for example, an anger management course, it becomes
obligatory that the Minister introduce such a programme in the correc-
tional centre where that offender is being incarcerated so that he or she
can participate in the programme, or the Minister must make sure that
that offender is transferred to a correctional centre where such a pro-
gramme exists. Another important aspect introduced by the Amendment
Act is that, should the Minister decline to put the offender on parole,
the Minister is under a duty, on the advice of the National Council, to
reconsider that offender’s case for parole after two years. It is argued
that even then the Minister is at liberty to refuse to release the offender
on parole. The Act is silent on what other remedy an inmate may have
if the Minister refuses parole, but it may be assumed that the Minister
would be in a position to advice the offender as to when he would be
considered for placement on parole again and would give reasons for
why parole has been denied again. Some prisoners may petition courts
for intervention.
7. Conclusion
This article has dealt with the changing face of life imprisonment in
South Africa since 1906. It has illustrated that as early as 1906, prisoners
serving life sentences were not expected to, nor did they in fact, spend
the rest of their lives in prison. Laws and policies have always been in
place to ensure that such prisoners were released after serving a speci-
fied number of years. Life imprisonment has been reserved for the most
serious offences. The article has also demonstrated that when the death
penalty was abolished, most of these sentences were converted into life
sentences and many into lengthy determinate prison terms. It has been
pointed out that the parole regime under which prisoners serving life
sentences are released has changed at different times and is often con-
fusing. The effect that the Criminal Law Amendment Act has had on the
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explosion of prisoners serving life sentences has also been canvassed. It
has been predicted that with the Regional Courts now having the juris-
diction to impose life imprisonment, the number of prisoners serving life
sentences is likely to increase rapidly. The above discussion has also
demonstrated that various factors have influenced the ‘changing face of
life imprisonment in South Africa’. These include the policies and atti-
tudes of the government in power towards punishment, the politics of
the day, crime trends and demanding particular interest groups.
Appendix 1: Offences under Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the MSL
Murder — When
(a) it was planned or premeditated;
(b) the victim was —
(i) a law enforcement officer performing his or her functions as such
whether on duty or not; or
(ii) a person who has given or was likely to give material evidence
with reference to any offence referred to in Schedule 1 to the
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977)162 at criminal
proceedings in any court;
(c) the death of the victim was caused by the accused in committing or
attempting to commit or after having committed or attempted to
commit one of the following offences:
(i) Rape: or
(ii) Robbery with aggravating circumstances: or
(d) The offence was committed by a person or group of persons or
syndicate acting in the execution or furtherance of a common pur-
pose or conspiracy.
Rape
(a) when committed —
(i) in circumstances where the victim was raped more than once
whether by the accused or by any co-perpetrator or accomplice;
(ii) by more than one person where such persons acted in the
execution or furtherance of a common purpose or conspiracy;
(iii) by a person who has been convicted of two or more offences of
162 There offences are: treason, sedition, murder, culpable homicide, rape, indecent assault,
sodomy, bestiality, robbery, kidnapping, child stealing, assault when dangerous wounds
inflicted, arson, malicious injury to property, breaking or entering any property with in
tent to commit an offence, theft, receiving stolen property, fraud, forgery or uttering a
forged document knowing it to have been forged, any offence punishable with the peri
od of imprisonment exceeding six months without the option of fine, offences relating
to the coinage, escaping from lawful custody, any conspiracy, incitement or attempt to
commit any of the offences mentioned above.
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rape, but has not yet been sentenced in respect of such convic-
tions: or
(iv) by a person. knowing that he has the acquired immune defi-
ciency syndrome or the human immune deficiency virus:
(b) where the victim–
(i) is a girl under the age of 16 years;
(ii) is a physically disabled woman who, due to her physical disabil-
ity, is rendered particularly vulnerable: or
(iii) is a mentally ill woman as contemplated in section 1 of the
Mental Health Act 1973 (Act No. 18 of 1973): or
(c) Involving the infliction of grievous bodily harm.
Appendix 2 (detailed statistics for footnote 24).
In 1949, 60 offenders were sentenced to death and 3 to life imprison-
ment; in 1950, 77 offenders were sentenced to death and 4 to life impri-
sonment; in 1951, 73 offenders were sentenced to death and 3 to life
imprisonment; in 1952, 77 offenders were sentenced to death and 1 to
life imprisonment; in 1953, 75 offenders were sentenced to death and 1
to life imprisonment; in 1954, 115 offenders were sentenced to death
and 1 to life imprisonment; 1955-56, 94 offenders were sentenced to
death and 19 to life imprisonment; 1956-57, 123 offenders were sen-
tenced to death and 34 to life imprisonment; in 1957-58, 128 offenders
were sentenced to death and 3 to life imprisonment; 1958-59, 105 offen-
ders were sentenced to death and 16 to life imprisonment; in 1959 -60,
134 offenders were sentenced to death and 23 to life imprisonment;
1960 -61, 108 offenders were sentenced to death and 23 to life imprison-
ment; 1961-62, 177 offenders were sentenced to death and 20 to life
imprisonment; in 1962-63, 149 offenders were sentenced to death and
21 to life imprisonment. See Special Report No 272, Statistics of Offences
and Penal Institutions, 1949-1962 (Bureau of Statistics, 1964) Table 10
— Convicted Prisoners Admitted According to Nature of Sentence, 1949-
1963. In 1963-64, 157 offenders were sentenced to death and 48 to life
imprisonment; in 1964-65, 124 offenders were sentenced to death and
21 to life imprisonment; 1965 -66, 138 offenders were sentenced to
death and 5 to life imprisonment; 1966-67, 143 offenders were sentenced
to death and 5 to life imprisonment; 1967-68, 115 offenders were sen-
tenced to death and 34 to life imprisonment; in 1968 -69, 107 offenders
were sentenced to death 13; in 1969-70, 95 offenders were sentenced to
death and 19 to life imprisonment. For the respective years, see Statistics
of Offences and Penal Institutions, 1963-64, Report No 08-01-01 (Table
10); 1965-66, Report No 08-01-02 ( Table 15); 1965-66, Report No 08-
01-02 (Table 15); 1966-67, Report No 08-01-03 (Table 16); 1967-68,
Report No 08-01-04 (Table 14); 1968-69, Report No 08-01-05 (Table 16);
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and 1969-70, Report No 08-01-06 (Table 16). All the Reports were
printed by the Government Printer, Pretoria. In the year 1977-78, 151
offenders were sentenced to death and 17 to life imprisonment; in 1978-
79, 158 offenders were sentenced to death and 12 to life imprisonment;
1979-80, 151 offenders were sentenced to death and 2 to life imprison-
ment; 1980-81, 148 offenders were sentenced to death and 8 to life
imprisonment; 1981-82, 124 offenders were sentenced to death and 7 to
life imprisonment; 1982-83, 171 offenders were sentenced to death and
4 to life imprisonment; 1985-85, 203 offenders were sentenced to death
and 4 to life imprisonment; 1985-86, 126 offenders were sentenced to
death and 4 to life imprisonment; 1986-87, 226 offenders were sentenced
to death and 6 to life imprisonment. See Statistics of Offences 1968-1969
to 1978-1979, Report No 08-01-10 (Table 5.1); 1968-1969 to 1978-1979,
Report No 08-01-10 (Table 5.5); 1979-1980, Report No 08-01-11 (Table
5); 1980-81, Report No 08-01-12 (Table 5); 1981-1982, Report No 08-01-
13 (Table 5); 1982-1983, Report No 08-01-14 (Table 5); 1984-1985,
Report No 08-01-16 (Table 5); 1985-1986, Report No 08-01-17 (Table 5);
Report No 00-11-01 (1986/87) (Table 5) respectively. All the reports
from 1977- 1986, were printed by the Government Printer, Pretoria.
However, that of 1986/87 was printed by the Central Statistics Services.
In 1987-88, 204 offenders were sentenced to death and 12 to life impri-
sonment; 1988-89, 154 offenders were sentenced to death and 6 to life
imprisonment; 1989-90, 123 offenders were sentenced to death and 9 to
life imprisonment; 1990-91, 64 offenders were sentenced to death and
28 to life imprisonment; 1991-92, 65 offenders were sentenced to death
and 28 to life imprisonment; 1992-93, 80 offenders were sentenced to
death and 18 to life imprisonment; 1993-94, 149 offenders were sen-
tenced to death and 15 to life imprisonment; 1994-95, 35 offenders were
sentenced to death and 49 to life imprisonment; and 1995-96 no offender
was sentenced to death but 122 were sentenced to life imprisonment.
See Crimes: Prosecutions and Convictions with Regard to Certain
Offences, Report No 00-11-01 (1987/88) (Table 5); Report No 00-11-01
(1988/89) (Table 5); Report No 00-11-01 (1989/90) (Table 5); Report No
00-11-01 (1990/91) (Table No 5); Report No 00-11-01 (1991/92) (Table
5); Report No 00-11-01 (1992/93) (Table 5); Report No 00-11-01 (1993/
94) (Table 5); Report No 00-11-01 (1994/95) (Table 5); and Report No
00-11-01 (1995/96) (Table 5) respectively). All the reports from 1987-
1995 were printed by the Central Statistical Services.
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